Judgement is only acceptable then to the extent that it is an act of the virtue of justice. This requires three things according to Aquinas, that it originates in an inclination toward justice, that it is done by an appropriate authority, and that it is according to that 'right reason' which governs the virtue of prudence. If it is against the inclination to justice, judgement is perverse and unjust. If it is done by someone without proper authority then it is a judgement that has been usurped. If it is unreasonable, because for example the matter remains uncertain or confused, then it is not perfect judgement but is a suspicious or a fearful judgement. Where one's suspicion about somebody is informed by prejudice and remains doubtful then it is wiser not to proceed to judgement but to give the person 'the benefit of the doubt'.
It is right that judgement should be according to the texts by which laws are enacted or in which they are contained. The natural law is not enacted by any written text but is established by creation itself. Nevertheless its requirements may be contained in a written text. (Murder is wrong not just because the law of the land says so but because the natural law says so.) In the case of positive laws, those made by governments and other public bodies, judgement should be according to the text by which such laws are enacted. (Driving on the left side of the road is wrong if you are in France. It is not against the natural law to drive on the left but it is against the laws of France and you will find this written somewhere in the French penal code.) If judgement is not according to texts then it will deviate from what is naturally or positively just.
Judgement is then a matter of interpreting how written laws are to be applied in particular situations. The same authority must stand behind the interpretation of a law as stands behind its enactment in the first place. So judgement can only be undertaken by a public authority who has responsibility for the common good of a community and to whom that community is subject. Just as it would be unjust for someone to oblige a person to observe a law which has not actually been enacted by public authority, so it would be unjust for someone to pass judgement where in doing so he is not sustained by public authority.
This last point is of crucial importance for capital punishment as without it any lynch mob might set itself up as an arbiter of justice.
We should refrain, then, from judging other people because we are never in a position to know everything relevant to their actions and decisions. Where we have responsibility for a common good and represent the authority of a community, however, we are obliged to make judgements for the sake of that good and for the sake of that community. We should do so with mindfulness, however, aware of the difficulties inherent in establishing justice in our world.
A wise and penetrating analysis : but it seems to me to make the assumption that all positive law accords with natural justice.
ReplyDeleteWhat would you say about the question of enacted laws which are NOT in accordance with natural justice ?
I'm not thinking, incidentally, only of those overtly repressive laws enacted by (say) Nazi Germany; the UK today continually introduces legislation - much of it secondary, and thus never fully debated by Parliament - which is at least arguably contrary to natural justice in at least some of its effects.
Obviously the virtue of obedience suggests that we should obey it nonetheless; but if that obedience will do harm to another, however small that harm may be, surely that creates a moral dilemma ?
I should be most interested to hear how that problem should be addressed.
Is the word 'Judgement', especially in the context of religion, faith, practice and life a Paradox that can never be avioded in totality?
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